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x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x G. Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms.7 But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these freedoms at all. SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Respondents. Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while it seeks to discourage data interference, it intrudes into the area of protected speech and expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms. Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the concept known as the "Zones of Privacy." The Court explained in "In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v. Mutuc,14 it ruled that the right to privacy exists independently of its identification with liberty; it is in itself fully deserving of constitutional protection. For this reason, the government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and contain and punish wrongdoings. The access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right.

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BARTOLOME, in his official capacity as Chief of the Philippine National Police, Respondents. Communicate in writing or by voice with any person through his e-mail address or telephone.

THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents. The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 4(a)(6) on ground of denial of equal protection is baseless.

MEDINA, JANETTE TORAL and ERNESTO SONIDO, JR., Petitioners, vs. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x G. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x G. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x G. The law is reasonable in penalizing him for acquiring the domain name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same.

But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The burden is on the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.2 Later, the strict scrutiny standard was used to assess the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights, as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection.3 In the cases before it, the Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act accessing the computer system of another without right.

The government certainly has the duty and the right to prevent these tomfooleries from happening and punish their perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention Act. According to this standard, a legislative classification that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional.